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VOLUME 53 2008 NUMBER 4
Issues in the Third Circuit
"PLACING A ROUND PEG INTO A SQUARE HOLE":'
THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES ERISA TO HYBRID
PENSION PLANS IN REGISTER v. PNC
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1974, after more than a decade of debate and public pressure, Con-
gress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-
the federal government's first attempt to regulate employer-provided pen-
sion plans. 2 As originally enacted, ERISA provided stability and security to
employees by restricting practices such as allocation of benefits based dis-
proportionately on workers' ages or terms of service. 3 Congress accom-
plished this by narrowly tailoring ERISA's prohibitions to the two forms of
pension plans prevalent among private employers in 1974: "defined con-
tribution plans" and "defined benefit plans."4 Until very recently, ERISA
1. Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 63 (3d Cir. 2007).
2. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006)) (establishing regula-
tory framework over private, employer-provided pension plans). Although some
commentators point out that the true roots of ERISA reach back nearly one hun-
dred years, it was not until the 1960s that pension abuse became a prominent issue
of national concern. See David N. Levine & August A. Imholtz, III, Introduction to
ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1-3 to 1-7 (PaulJ. Schneider & Brian M. Pinheiro
eds., 2008) (explaining issues concerning private pensions, beginning in 1875, but
noting that pension stability and reform did not receive major attention from
United States government until John F. Kennedy's election as President in 1960).
Throughout the early 1970s, New York SenatorJacobjavits led a reform movement
that ultimately culminated in the enactment of ERISA. See id. at 1-7 (discussing
process of hearings and proposals that brought attention to cause of pension
regulation).
3. See id. at 1-8 (discussing worker protections contained in ERISA). Other
provisions directed towards this end were added to ERISA in 1986. See Pub. L. No.
99-506, § 9201, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986) (prohibiting cessation or decrease in rate of
increase in employees' accrued pension benefits, or conversely, decrease in em-
ployer contributions to employees' accounts, dependent on form of private pen-
sion, due to employees' age); Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 638
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing ERISA's prohibitions on age discrimination, based on
form of employers' pension plan).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(a) (2006) (classifying all private pension plans as one
of two possible forms, each of which is subject to specific requirements); see also 29
(639)
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has remained substantially unaltered on this point.5 The complex field of
employer-provided pension plans, however, has not.
6
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the next two decades,
many employers developed a third type of pension plan that combines
attributes of the two previously familiar types. 7 This third type, known as a
U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), 1002(35) (2006) (defining "defined benefit plan" as "a pen-
sion plan other than a[ ] [defined contribution plan]"); Esden v. Bank of Boston,
229 F.3d 154, 159 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000) (characterizing federal pension regulation as
"rigidly binary"). For a detailed discussion of these two forms of plans and the
consequences of ERISA's original binary structure, see infra notes 17-25 and ac-
companying text.
In order to prevent age discrimination, ERISA prohibits employers that pro-
vide defined contribution plans from increasing or decreasing their contributions
to employees' accounts based on employees' ages. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2) (A)
(prohibiting employer from ceasing or decreasing contributions to individual ac-
counts because of employees' ages). Employers that provide defined benefit plans
are prohibited from causing their employees' benefits-that is, actual receipts
rather than employer contributions-to cease or decrease on account of age. See
29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (H) (i) (prohibiting age discrimination by employers that
would cause actual employee receipts to cease or decrease on account of age);
Register, 477 F.3d at 64 (discussing ERISA's different anti-age-discrimination re-
quirements for different forms of plans).
5. See Register, 477 F.3d at 65 n.8 (noting that Congress recently attempted to
adapt federal regulatory framework by enacting rules specifically tailored for third
form of pension plan); Cooper, 457 F.3d at 638 (discussing 1986 amendments to
ERISA that did not change overall classification of pension plans); Esden, 229 F.3d
at 159 n.6 (discussing "rigid[ ]" nature of regulatory framework despite changes in
industry); see also Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (providing special anti-age-dis-
crimination rules for third form of pension plan). For a detailed discussion of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 and its potential impact on the controversy ad-
dressed in Register, see infra notes 113-231 and accompanying text.
6. See Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 817-18 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(describing innovations of third form of pension plan, controversy surrounding
plans and government's initial response); Barry Kozak & Joshua Waldbeser, Much
Ado about the Meaning of "Benefit Accrual": The Issue of Age Discrimination in Hybrid
Cash Balance Plan Qualification Is Dying but Not Yet Dead, 40J. MARSHALL L. REv. 867,
868 (2007) (discussing development of new form of pension plan in 1980s and
1990s and regulation of these plans by ERISA). Beginning in 1985, private em-
ployers began using a third form of plan that they believed would help attract
younger workers. That move angered many older workers who were then enrolled
in one of the two traditional forms of plans. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 818
(discussing development of hybrid plans and eventual need for courts to consider
legality of such plans as applied to older workers). For an extended discussion of
this third form of pension plans and the state of the controversy surrounding
them, see infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
7. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (noting first use of third form of plans and
their "hybrid" nature); see also Esden, 229 F.3d at 158-59 (discussing nature of hy-
brid plans, as well as costs and benefits they provide to employers). Hybrid plans
combine attributes of both defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans.
See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158-59 (discussing attributes of plans, relative to those of
older forms of plan). Specifically, hybrid plans have individual-albeit hypotheti-
cal-accounts for each employee, like defined contribution plans. Like defined
benefit plans, however, the accounts do not actually vest to employees, and bene-
fits are drawn from the employer's collected assets. See Register, 477 F.3d at 63
[Vol. 53: p. 639
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"hybrid" or "cash balance" plan, offers the possibility of flexibility for em-
ployers, as well as autonomy and security for employees, in levels not avail-
able in the two traditional plans.8 Yet, hybrid plans also come with a
distinct disadvantage to employers seeking to revamp their pension sys-
tems: ERISA's 1974 authors never contemplated if or how the statute's
various prohibitions affected these then-unknown pension plans.9 In re-
cent years, the task of interpreting ERISA's impact on this third type of
plan has fallen to the federal courts and, most recently, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in Register v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
10
(discussing hybrid nature of plans and benefits they provide employers); Esden,
229 F.3d at 158-59 (describing attributes of hybrid plan).
8. See Register, 477 F.3d at 63 (explaining benefits of hybrid plans). In these
plans, employees draw benefits from employer contributions and interest credits
gained over time. See id. (explaining dual methods of funding plans). Upon re-
tirement, employees typically may choose a form of payment that gives them the
greatest combined benefits from the two. See id. (discussing flexibility for employ-
ees under plans). Some believe that this flexibility is particularly important to
younger workers who, unlike their older counterparts, may foresee changes in
their employers over time. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (discussing advantages
of hybrid plans that are attractive to employers and employees). Courts have
noted that cash balance plans became popular in response to a volatile 1980s stock
market, in the aftermath of which early-vesting, flexible plans became more desira-
ble than previously anticipated. See Hirt v. Equitable Ret. Plan, 441 F. Supp. 2d
516, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 533 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing develop-
ment and advantages of cash balance plans).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the advantages em-
ployers expect hybrid pensions to bestow upon employees: "(1) [T]hey are easier
to understand; (2) they allow greater portability; (3) their benefits accrue more
evenly over an employee's life-cycle; and (4) they are, therefore, better suited to
the increased job-mobility of contemporary labor markets." Esden, 229 F.3d at 158
n.5 (discussing potential advantages of hybrid pensions). For employers, the court
foresaw:
(1)[B]ecause employees better appreciate the value of their pension
rights, the employer's fringe benefit dollar has greater impact; and (2)
the employer retains the funding advantages of a defined benefit plan,
namely (a) actual contributions are made to a single trust fund, based on
actuarial assumptions; therefore (b) the employer retains funding flexi-
bility as long as the solvency of the plan is maintained; and (c) the invest-
ment experience in excess of the promised interest credits (as well as
forfeitures of the non-vested benefits of any terminated participants) be-
longs to the employer. In short, advocates of this "hybrid" claim it offers
employers-if not all employees-the best of both the defined benefit
and the defined contribution pension formats.
Id. (discussing advantages of hybrid pension plans).
9. See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 641 (noting lack of guidance on meaning of "benefit
accrual" in the statute as applied to hybrid plans); cf Esden, 229 F.3d at 159 (noting
that regardless of employers' objectives in using hybrid plans, regulatory frame-
work geared toward traditional plans must be followed).
10. 477 F.3d at 68, 72 (finding ERISA's anti-age-discrimination and anti-
backloading provisions applicable to hybrid pensions, but only to employer contri-
butions, not employee receipts). See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 640-41 (noting that Sev-
enth Circuit is first court of appeals to decide applicability of ERISA's anti-age-
discrimination provision to hybrid pension plans). Although only two courts of
appeals have heard such cases to date, many district courts, most notably those
2008]
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This Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's preferred analysis in cases
concerning the applicability of ERISA to hybrid pensions, and serves as a
guide to practitioners bringing or defending against these cases before the
court.1 Part II explains hybrid pension plans, the difficulty of applying
certain provisions of ERISA to these plans and the federal judiciary's solu-
tions to this problem.12 Part III analyzes Register, setting forth the Third
Circuit's methodology and reasoning in finding that ERISA's anti-age dis-
crimination and anti-backloading provisions apply to hybrid pensions, but
only to formulas for employer contributions, and not to employee re-
ceipts. 13 Part IV explains the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress's
recent attempt to solve the same problems faced by the Third Circuit in
Register. 4 As Part IV demonstrates, Congress reached many of the same
conclusions as the Register court, but also left several questions unan-
swered, demonstrating the continued importance of Register given the
growing popularity of cash balance pension plans.1 5 Part V concludes by
offering suggestions for practitioners before the Third Circuit. Specifi-
under the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, have heard them in
recent years. Compare Drutis v. Quebecor World (USA), Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 580,
591 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (finding hybrid plans permissible under ERISA's anti-age-dis-
crimination provisions), affid sub nom. Drutis v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d 608
(6th Cir. 2007), Hirt, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (same), Laurent v. Price-
WaterhouseCoopers LLP, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same), and
Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88, 93-94 (D. Md. 2004) (same), with Richards v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150, 167 (D. Conn. 2006) (finding ERISA's
anti-age-discrimination provisions to prohibit hybrid pension plans), In reJ.P. Mor-
gan Chase Cash Balance Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same), In
re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d 323, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(same), overruled by Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, No. 03-CV-4822, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56741, at *4748 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2008), and Parson v. AT&T
Pension Benefit Plan, No. 3:06CV552, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93135 (D. Conn. Dec.
22, 2006) (same). In 2008, a district court within the Second Circuit affirmatively
overruled a previous case concerning hybrid pensions and endorsed the view es-
poused by the Seventh Circuit in Cooper. See Vaughn, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56741,
at *4748 (adopting Coopds reasoning and holding).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of ERISA restrictions as
applied to a hybrid pension plan, see infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
For suggestions to practitioners bringing or defending similar cases before the
court, see infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the development of hybrid pension plans, the difficulty
posed by applying ERISA's anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions
to these plans and solutions proposed by commentators and several federal courts,
see infra notes 17-63 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's Register analysis, which applied ER-
ISA to a hybrid plan but in such a way that permitted the plans to remain in effect,
see infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Pension Protection Act of
2006, which sought to remedy the tension between hybrid pension plans and ER-
ISA, see infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 on future ERISA-related controversies, see infra notes 112-30.
[Vol. 53: p. 639
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cally, Part V identifies the potential problems in future ERISA cases and
discusses arguments that will be most persuasive to the court.
16
II. BACKGROUND
A. ERISA, Hybrid Pensions and the Problem
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, in order to oversee and protect the
methods by which employers ensured pensions for their employees.
17
Prior to 2006, ERISA contained provisions that restricted, among other
things, age discrimination through allocation of pension benefits, as well
as the "backloading" of benefits to discriminate against short-term work-
ers.18 Since its enactment, ERISA has applied these proscriptions to two
recognized forms of private pension plans: defined contribution plans and
defined benefit plans.1 9
16. For suggestions to practitioners before the Third Circuit concerning ER-
ISA and hybrid pensions, see infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
17. See Levine & Imholtz, supra note 2, at 1-3 to 1-8 (discussing issues and
concerns that culminated in passage of ERISA). As commentators have noted,
federal interest in private pensions began not long after pensions became popular
during the Industrial Revolution. See id. at 1-4 (discussing early development of
private pension plans and federal tax policy aimed at stimulation of such plans).
Apart from efforts on the part of the Judiciary and Congress to make private pen-
sion plans both transparent and a part of collective bargaining agreements, how-
ever, there was little support for direct federal regulation of pension plans until
the 1960s. See id. at 1-4 to 1-6 (discussing early judicial opinions and federal laws
that regulated private pensions as part of collective bargaining and sought to pre-
vent abuse through transparency). After a presidential commission and the public
revelation as to rampant abuse and instability, Congress passed ERISA nearly unan-
imously in 1974, despite criticisms from both labor and business interests. See id. at
1-7 (discussing opposition to ERISA from such disparate actors as activist Ralph
Nader and conservative Nixon Administration).
Among ERISA's initial protections were rules regarding minimum funding,
plan transparency and federal insurance in the event of bankruptcy. See id. at 1-8
(discussing protections provided in ERISA at enactment). In later years, Congress
amended ERISA multiple times to meet the changing demands of the industry, but
never moved away from a statutory classification for only two forms of pensions.
See Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing
ERISA amendments' solidification of binary structure of pension regulation); Le-
vine & Imholtz, supra note 2, at 1-9 to 1-20 (discussing amendments to ERISA
aimed to help workers with multiple employers, increase security in workers'
health benefits and otherwise meet demands of evolving pension industry).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B) (2006) (prohibiting amendments to de-
fined benefit plans that cause disproportionate increases in benefits of workers
with long terms of service over those of shorter-term workers); § 1054(b) (1) (H) (i)
(prohibiting age discrimination by employers that would cause employee receipts
to cease or decrease on account of employees' ages); § 1054(b) (2) (A) (prohibit-
ing employers using defined contribution plan from ceasing or decreasing contri-
butions to individual accounts because of employees' ages).
19. See Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 61-62 (3d Cir.
2007) (noting that under ERISA, there are only two types of pensions); Kozak &
Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 867 (explaining that under ERISA, there are only two
permissible forms of private pension plans).
2008]
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Under defined contribution plans, employers promise to place spe-
cific amounts of assets into individual employee accounts. 20 The balance
of these accounts belongs to employees at their retirements. 21 ERISA con-
siders every private pension plan that does not meet this definition to be a
"defined benefit plan."22
Under a typical defined benefit plan, an employer promises to pay an
annuity to employees after their retirements; the funds for the annuity
come out of a general pool of the employer's assets. 23 The amount of
each employee's annuity is calculated using a formula that may take into
account the employee's term of service, age and other factors. 24 By the
mid-1990s, however, a new form of pension plan had become prevalent.
25
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006) (defining defined contribution plans as
"pension plan[s] which provide[ ] for an individual account for each participant
and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's
account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of ac-
counts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's
account").
21. See id. (defining defined contribution plans). In Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, the Supreme Court characterized defined contribution plans as plans in
which employers contribute fixed amounts, all of which belong to individual em-
ployees. See 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (providing definition of defined contribu-
tion plans). The Court in Hughes Aircraft noted that in a defined contribution
plan, employees bear the risk, but "there can never be an insufficiency of funds in
the plan to cover promised benefits . . . since each beneficiary is entitled to
whatever assets are dedicated to his individual account." Id. (quoting Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 364 n.5 (1980)) (describ-
ing risks and benefits of defined contribution plans); see also Register, 477 F.3d at 61
(explaining nature of defined contribution plans).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2006) (defining defined benefit plans as "pen-
sion plan[s] other than [defined contribution plans]").
23. See Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 439 (discussing funding and ownership at-
tributes of most defined benefit plans). The Supreme Court described a typical
defined benefit plan as one that "consists of a general pool of assets rather than
individual dedicated accounts," and one in which "the employee, upon retirement,
is entitled to a fixed periodic payment." Id. (quoting Comm'r v. Keystone Consol.
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)) (describing attributes of defined benefit
plan). In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the risk. See id. at 439-40
(explaining allocation of risk in defined benefit plan).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (H) (ii) (2006) (permitting such factors to con-
tribute to formulation for employer contributions to employees' pension benefits).
There is a limit, however, to the extent that factors such as age and term of service
may contribute to determination of employees' benefits. See § 1054(b) (2) (H) (i)
(prohibiting age discrimination in accrual of employee benefits); § 1054(b)(1)(B)
(prohibiting jumps in benefits over time that discriminate against short-term work-
ers). Specifically, ERISA prohibits the "benefit accrual" under a defined benefit
plan from favoring younger workers. See § 1054(b) (1) (H) (i) (describing anti-age
discrimination requirements of defined benefit plan).
Traditionally, these provisions have been assumed to hold that the benefits
received by younger and older workers cannot be determined solely by age or
length of service. See Register, 477 F.3d at 63-64 (discussing definition of term "ben-
efit accrual" in statute as applied to traditional defined benefit plan).
25. See generally Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (discussing birth and growth of hybrid pension plans); Kozak & Waldbeser,
[Vol. 53: p. 639644
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These new types of plans, known as "cash balance" or "hybrid" plans,
contain elements of both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans. 26 Employers believed that such hybrid plans would attract younger
employees in a dynamic labor market by increasing both an employee's
choice in form and autonomy over their respective benefits. 27 Like em-
ployers that use defined contribution plans, employers using cash balance
plans maintain individual accounts for each employee. 28 In the case of
cash balance plans, however, these accounts are not actual assets, but in-
stead are merely hypothetical reflections of accrued employer
obligations.
2 9
Benefits in hybrid accounts accrue in two forms: "pay" or "earnings"
credits and interest credits. 30 Earnings credits, like employer contribu-
supra note 6, at 868 (noting that hybrid plans developed and became popular in
1980s and 1990s).
26. See Register, 477 F.3d at 62 (noting that although cash balance plan is by
law defined benefit plan, it in fact has "attributes of both" defined benefit and
defined contribution plans); Cooper, 457 F.3d at 637 (classifying cash balance plan
as defined benefit plan, but noting that "[i]t is almost, but not quite, a defined-
contribution [sic] plan"). At least two of the federal circuit courts of appeals have
noted the dichotomy. See, e.g., Register, 477 F.3d at 62 (discussing hybrid nature of
cash balance pension plans); Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 158, 159 n.6
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that cash balance plans are designed to imitate certain at-
tributes of defined contribution plans, but are classified as defined benefit plans by
law).
27. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (describing cash balance plans as re-
sponse to workers' demands for flexibility and autonomy over their benefits).
28. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 (explaining attributes of typical cash balance
pension plan that coincide with those of defined contribution plan).
29. See Register, 477 F.3d at 62 (stating that although "cash balance plans are
like defined contribution plans in that both define the employee's benefit in terms
of a stated balance," that balance is in fact hypothetical); Esden, 229 F.3d at 158
(discussing typical cash balance plan). As the Esden court pointed out, the individ-
ual accounts used in a cash balance plan are merely hypothetical and reflect
amounts owed to employees, not assets yet dedicated to employees' benefits. See
Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 (discussing structure of cash balance plan). By tracking the
amount that will eventually be owed to employees over time, employers using cash
balance accounts are able to inform employees of what they may expect to receive
in the future, and therefore "mimic the simplicity of a defined contribution plan."
See id. (discussing purpose of hypothetical accounts in typical cash balance pension
plan); see also Frequently Asked Questions About Cash Balance Pension Plans,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faqconsumer-cashbalanceplans.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008) (describing basic attributes of all cash balance pension plans).
30. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 (explaining two forms of contributions in cash
balance plan). In a typical cash balance plan, the first set of credits, "earnings
credits," come from the employer through formulas similar to those used in de-
fined benefit plans. Compare id. (describing earnings credits in typical cash balance
plan), with id. at 158 n.4 (describing formula for employer contribution in typical
defined benefit plan).
"Interest credits" supply contributions through compounding of account bal-
ances by an internal or external interest rate. See id. at 158 (explaining interest
credits in typical cash balance pension plan). When employees enrolled in cash
balance accounts retire, their accrued benefit is calculated by converting their hy-
pothetical account balance of interest and earnings credits into annuities for life,
2008] CASEBRIEF 645
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tions in a defined benefit plan, reflect obligations on the part of an em-
ployer to contribute to employees' ultimate benefit.3 1 Interest credits, on
the other hand, reflect accrued interest on account balances that will also
eventually belong to employees over the course of their drawing payments
from the employer's assets.
32
Despite their hybrid nature, however, cash balance pension plans are
considered defined benefit plans under ERISA.33 This classification cre-
ates incongruous results when certain ERISA prohibitions are strictly ap-
plied to a cash balance plan. 34 For example, if a plan requires that
employees as individuals accrue interest credits over time, younger em-
ployees in that plan will receive more than their older peers, in possible
violation of ERISA anti-age-discrimination rules. 35 Moreover, because an
employer's decision to switch to a cash balance plan will frequently cause a
temporary freeze in hypothetical benefits, there will typically be a large
jump in benefits for some employees at some later point in time, possibly
causing backloading of benefits to a prohibited degree. 36 As many federal
beginning at normal retirement age. See Brian M. Pinheiro & Jennifer DeMarco,
Qualified Retirement Plans, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 3-13 (Paul J. Schnei-
der & Brian M. Pinheiro eds., 2008) (discussing interest credits and relationship to
actual employees' benefits). Often, employees enrolled in a cash balance plan will
also have the option of receiving their benefit as a lump-sum payment, which
should be equal to the balance of their hypothetical account. See id. (discussing
effect of conversion from annuity to lump-sum payment in cash balance account).
31. See id. (describing earnings credits and interest credits in cash balance
pension plan); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999)
(explaining employer contributions in typical defined benefits plan).
32. See Pinheiro & DeMarco, supra note 30, at 3-13 (explaining interest credits
in typical cash balance plan and how such credits affect ultimate employee
benefits).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (35) (2006) (defining defined benefit plan as "a pen-
sion plan other than a [defined contribution plan]"); Esden, 229 F.3d at 158
(" [N]otwithstanding that cash balance plans are designed to imitate some features
of defined contribution plans, they are nonetheless defined benefit plans under
ERISA.").
34. See Pinheiro & DeMarco, supra note 30, at 3-13 to 3-14 (noting that appli-
cation of ERISA's anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions to cash
balance accounts is controversial and often litigated).
35. See id. (explaining basis of age discrimination claim against cash balance
accounts). Two commentators provided the following illustration of the problem:
For a 30-year-old employee, the value of a[n earnings] credit and the 35
years of interest credits associated with that [earnings] credit at normal
retirement age is greater than the value of a[n earnings] credit and 10
years of associated credits for a 55-year-old. When viewed as a defined
contribution plan on the other hand, the [earnings] credit and interest
credit added to a participant's hypothetical account each year is the same
for every employee, regardless of age.
Id. (providing hypothetical to explain basis of age discrimination claim against
cash balance pension plan); see also Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d
636, 640 (7th Cir. 2006) (providing detailed hypothetical to explain effect of inter-
est credits in age discrimination claim against cash balance pension plan).
36. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 167 n.18 (explaining anti-backloading provisions of
ERISA). The ERISA anti-backloading provisions set maximum rates for the in-
646 [Vol. 53: p. 639
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courts faced with such issues have acknowledged, these consequences are
inherent in an employer's adoption of a cash balance plan.3 7 Therefore,
applying these provisions of ERISA strictly to cash balance pension plans
could effectively render such plans impermissible.
3 8
B. Development of the Case Law: A Split Among the Federal Judiciary
In recent years, many lower federal courts have noted the contradic-
tion inherent in applying the "rigidly binary" nature of federal pension
regulation to cash balance pension plans. 39 Courts have predominately
chosen one of two modes of analysis to resolve this apparent conflict.
40
crease of benefits in an account over time. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (B) (2006)
(prohibiting increases in benefits over time at rate greater than prescribed maxi-
mum). In effect, these standards prohibit employers from allowing employees'
benefits to accrue only after the employees have remained with a single employer
for a long period of time. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 167 n.18 (explaining effect of
ERISA's anti-backloading provisions); see also Register, 477 F.3d at 71 (citing Hoover
v. Cumberland, Md. Area Teamsters Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977, 982 n.10 (3d Cir.
1985)) (determining that purpose of ERISA's anti-backloading provisions is to pro-
hibit discrimination against short-term workers).
37. See, e.g., Laurent v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that under reasoning advocated by plaintiffs in ERISA
age discrimination case, "all cash balance plans violate the ERISA age discrimina-
tion provision"); cf Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 (discussing other problems inherent in
applying certain ERISA provisions to cash balance pension plans).
38. See Register, 477 F.3d at 64 n.5 (refraining from listing specific "horribles"
that may flow from decision concerning ERISA and cash balance pensions, but
conceding that "much is at stake"). Because the accrual of interest credits is an
inherent part of cash balance plans, prohibiting their increase over time would
defeat the purpose of a hybrid plan. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 n.5 (discussing
perceived advantages of cash balance plan, most of which depend upon accrual of
interest credits over time); Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 876 (stating that,
should ERISA provisions intended to regulate traditional defined benefit plans be
applied to cash balance plans, cash balance plans are "doomed to fail").
39. See, e.g., Esden, 229 F.3d at 159 n.6 (describing nature of federal pension
regulation). Following the Second Circuit's Esden decision, the tension between
ERISA and hybrid pension plans was noted throughout the Second Circuit's dis-
trict courts. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d
323, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting dramatic consequences of classification of cash
balance plans as defined benefit plans under ERISA); In reJ.P. Morgan Chase Cash
Balance Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 479, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Richards v. Fleet-
Boston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150, 163 (D. Conn. 2006) (same). The same
consequences have been noted elsewhere throughout the federal judiciary, but
with less frequency. See, e.g., Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 817-18
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (noting that rules regarding defined benefit plans pre-date devel-
opment of cash balance plans).
40. See Register, 477 F.3d at 66 (noting split between federal district courts on
issue of how to apply certain provisions of ERISA to cash balance pension plans).
Compare In re Citigroup, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (construing ERISA strictly and find-
ing violation by cash balance plan), In rejP. Morgan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 485-87
(same), and Richards, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 (same), with Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639
(using practical function of statute and underlying congressional intent to deter-
mine that cash balance plans do not violate ERISA), Laurent, 448 F. Supp. 2d at
553 (same), and Drutis v. Quebecor World (USA), Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 580, 588
9
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Some have employed strict construction of ERISA and related regulations
in order to preserve the equity and stability first sought by the statute's
1974 framers.41 Others have instead looked primarily to the balance be-
tween stability for workers and flexibility for employers implicit in the stat-
ute, as well as the practical impact of possible decisions.
4 2
Not surprisingly, this interpretive divide has caused courts to reach
diametrically opposing conclusions when deciding how to apply ERISA's
anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions to cash balance
pension plans. 43 In recent ERISA cases-including Register-the Third
Circuit has employed a broad method of analysis.44 In those recent cases,
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (same), affd sub nom. Drutis v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d 608
(6th Cir. 2007).
41. See, e.g., Esden, 229 F.3d at 159 (disregarding hybrid nature of cash bal-
ance pension plans in order to apply ERISA as if cash balance plans were tradi-
tional defined benefit plans); In rejP. Morgan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87 (using
dictionary to interpret congressional intent embodied in ERISA and enforcing ER-
ISA provisions against cash balance pension plan); see also Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(C), 88 Stat. 832 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006)) (finding need to improve "equitable
character" of private pension plans through vesting rules, minimum funding stan-
dards and requirements for insurance).
42. See, e.g., Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639 (looking to practical function and impact
of disputed ERISA provisions in order to determine their effect on cash balance
pensions); Drutis, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (citing Cooper, 457 F.3d at 638-39) (consid-
ering hybrid nature of cash balance pension plans in order to strike balance be-
tween needs of workers and employers, as well as underlying goals of ERISA);
Laurent, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (noting that despite their legal classification, cash
balance plans are different than traditional defined benefit plans and, therefore,
applying ERISA provisions strictly to such plans would not be "logical").
43. Compare In re Citigroup, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (construing ERISA strictly
and finding violation by cash balance plan), In reJP. Morgan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at
485-87 (same), and Richards, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 (same), with Cooper, 457 F.3d
at 639 (using practical function of statute and underlying congressional intent to
determine that cash balance plan did not violate ERISA), Drutis, 459 F. Supp. 2d at
588 (same), and Laurent, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (same).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993)
(adopting Eleventh Circuit's test for determining presence of plan by considering
whether reasonable observer could identify attributes of plan based on surround-
ing circumstances); see also Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir.
1982) (announcing test for presence of plan under ERISA); Joshua Bachrach et
al., Third Circuit, in ERISA SURVEY OF FEDERAL CIRCUITS 61 (Brooks R. Magratten
ed., 2007) (discussing Third Circuit's adoption of Eleventh Circuit's rule). The
Third Circuit's analysis in Smith looked to the balance achieved by Congress in the
overall statutory scheme and considered the practical observations of a reasonable
observer. See Smith, 6 F.3d at 136-37 (discussing context and balance of statutory
scheme).
In other cases, the court has shown concern for the practical impact its deci-
sions may have on the private sector. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
214 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing practical impact of ruling). Even
when compelled by Supreme Court precedent to reach a particular outcome, the
court has taken pains to discuss the practically "unsatisfying" implications of its
holding. See id. (discussing impact of ruling regarding standard of review over
pension plans); Bachrach et al., supra note 44, at 70 (discussing holding and impli-
cations of Pinto).
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the court felt compelled by both Supreme Court and Third Circuit prece-
dent to analyze the overall congressional intent present within the statu-
tory scheme and to determine the reasonable impact of solutions
proposed before it.4
5
1. Esden and the Early Trend Towards Strict Construction
In Esden v. Bank of Boston,46 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals be-
came the first court to provide a general framework for applying certain
ERISA provisions to cash balance pension plans. 47 Specifically, the Esden
court decided that ERISA rules regarding conversion of employees' bene-
fits to lump-sum payments applied to a cash balance plan in the same man-
ner as to a defined benefit plan. 48 The court reasoned that it was bound,
both by Treasury Department regulations and by the original intent of
Congress in enacting ERISA, to apply the statute's exacting rules to the
cash balance plan.
49
45. See Register, 477 F.3d at 66 (discussing Supreme Court and Third Circuit
cases influencing court's decision). The Supreme Court has issued decisions that
guide lower court analysis of ERISA and other complex statutory schemes. See id.
(applying Supreme Court precedent to determine proper application of ERISA to
cash balance pension plan). In such cases, the Court has determined that courts
should interpret congressional intent by examining the overall statutory scheme
and practical implications of proposed solutions. See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp.,
502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (requiring interpreting courts to consider statutory con-
text); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (requiring that statu-
tory interpretation lead to reasonable results given reality of context); Alaka v.
Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that court should
determine congressional intent by analyzing overall statutory scheme); Rosenberg
v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2001) (determining that role of
court is to interpret congressional intent); Evcco Leasing Corp. v. Ace Trucking
Co., 828 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1987) (requiring interpretation of statute not lead
to unjust or unreasonable results). Specifically in the context of pensions, the
Court has consistently looked to practical concerns and a need to preserve some
degree of employer flexibility in establishing and maintaining a private pension
plan. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (discussing
nature of two traditional forms of pension plan and legal implications of each);
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) (allowing time value of
money to cause increased receipts of pension benefits for younger workers without
violating anti-age-discrimination rules).
46. 229 F.3d at 157.
47. See id. (noting controversy surrounding ERISA and cash balance pensions
as "relatively new," and recognizing issue in case before it as one of first impression
in courts of appeals).
48. See id. (stating issue of case and announcing decision against employer).
49. See id. at 158, 162, 164 (citing authority that court had interpreted as re-
quiring strict reading of ERISA when applied to cash balance pension plans). Es-
den presented one issue that was not material to the Third Circuit's Register
analysis: the degree of deference afforded to a federal agency's binding decision
on a matter of ERISA interpretation. See id. at 164-74 (discussing authority of Trea-
sury Department notices and regulations on issue before court). In short, the Es-
den court determined that multiple Treasury Department decisions spoke directly
to the question before it, and recognized that the court was thus required to ac-
cord deference to those decisions unless the decisions proved to be unreasonable
2008]
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Some federal courts, particularly those within the Second Circuit,
have interpreted Esden as a blanket endorsement of strict ERISA construc-
tion, including the interpretation of the term "benefit accrual" in the stat-
ute's anti-age-discrimination provision. 50 These courts, finding "benefit
accrual" to mean the amounts employees receive (just as it would when
applied to a traditional defined benefit plan), have concluded that ERISA
forbids the accrual of interest credits over time. 5 1 According to these
courts, this method of analysis enforces explicit mandates embodied in
ERISA. 52 It also allows the courts to defer to congressional wisdom and
await further guidance without enforcing their own economic views. 53 At
the same time, however, this method of analysis threatens to render all
cash balance pension plans illegal under ERISA.
54
2. Broader, Practical Analysis Culminating in Cooper
Other lower courts have sought to reconcile ERISA's binary structure
with the development of cash balance pension plans by looking to the
practical impact of their decisions and Congress's broader intent ex-
pressed in the statute.5 5 Citing Congress's overall determination that
there may be no allocation of resources unduly based on age or term of
or clearly erroneous. See id. (discussing impact of Treasury decisions on question
before court); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (announcing two-part test for determining deference that
federal courts must show to agency determinations of law).
50. See In reJ.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 479., 486-
87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying Esden reasoning to determine that cash balance plan
"is not age neutral"); Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150, 164
(D. Conn. 2006) (applying Esden to determine that cash balance plan must con-
form to ERISA in same manner as defined benefit plan).
51. See In re JP. Morgan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88 (finding that because
younger workers enrolled in cash balance plan will necessarily accrue more inter-
est credits over time than will older workers enrolled in cash balance plan, "benefit
accrued" of such workers is impermissibly discriminatory); Richards, 427 F. Supp.
2d at 164 (determining that ERISA rules apply to cash balance plan just as they
apply to defined benefit plan).
52. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 172-73 (discussing Congress's purpose for enacting
ERISA).
53. Compare id. (deferring to economic analysis of Congress and Internal Rev-
enue Service), with Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plans, 457 F.3d 637, 642-43 (7th
Cir. 2006) (applying court's economic analysis to determine that cash balance plan
is permissible under ERISA).
54. See Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 64 (3d Cir. 2007)
(discussing possible consequences if ERISA were found to bar employers' use of
interest credits and other attributes of cash balance plans).
55. See, e.g., Drutis v. Quebecor World (USA), Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 580, 588
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (finding broad intent of Congress to support decision for cash
balance plan under ERISA), affd sub nom. Drutis v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d
608 (6th Cir. 2007); Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (looking to such factors as "legislative history, the broader purposes of the
legislation at issue ... as well as common sense and the practical implications of
the alternative interpretations" to determine that cash balance plan is permissible
under ERISA).
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service, these lower courts have defined "benefit accrual" in ERISA as em-
ployer contributions, rather than employee receipts. 56 In so doing, these
courts permit interest credits in employees' individual accounts to in-
crease over time, causing increased benefits for some workers.
57
In Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plans,5 8 the Seventh Circuit became
the first federal court of appeals to accept this rationale and find cash
balance pensions permissible under ERISA.59 In Cooper, the court deter-
mined that because the disparity in the rate of increase in younger and
older workers' accounts occurred not as a result of additional contribu-
tions by employers, but because of interest compounded over time, the
plans did not violate federal law. 60 Acknowledging that hybrid plans are
considered defined benefit plans by law, the Cooper court determined that
the term "benefit accrual" must have a different meaning when applied to
cash balance plans.6 1 Accordingly, the court found that the overall
56. See Drutis, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 588 ("[T]he Congressional [sic] intent to
avoid age discrimination under both types of plans can only be carried out if 'ben-
efit accrual' means the same things as 'allocations' to the employee's account.");
Hirt v. Equitable Ret. Plan, 441 F. Supp. 2d 516, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
relevant provisions of ERISA were added not to change employer methods of dis-
tributing contributions, but to prohibit discrimination against workers who con-
tinue working beyond normal retirement age), affd, 533 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008);
Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31 (determining that Congress's intent in enacting
ERISA and subsequent amendments thereto was to prevent employers from stop-
ping or decreasing contributions to employees' benefits on account of age).
57. See Drutis, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (finding that precedent and legislative
history suggest cash balance plan is permissible under ERISA); Hirt, 441 F. Supp.
2d at 518 (finding that cash balance plan is permissible under ERISA); Eaton, 117
F. Supp. 2d at 826 (stating that finding against cash balance plan under ERISA
would require "strange" reading of statute).
58. 457 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2006).
59. See id. at 639 (determining that cash balance accounts are permissible
under ERISA because, in eyes of court, Congress did not seek to prohibit benefit
through increasing time-value of money); see also Drutis, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 587
(crediting Seventh Circuit as first appellate court to decide case applying ERISA
age discrimination provision to cash balance pension plan); Laurent v. Price-
WaterhouseCoopers LLP, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
60. See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639 (stating that "most natural reading" of "benefit
accrual" suggests that term refers to employer contributions).
61. See id. (using regulations regarding defined contribution plans to guide
analysis of regulation applied to cash balance plan). The court noted that the
term "allocation" in the anti-age-discrimination section applicable to defined con-
tribution plans refers to employer input. See id. (discussing meaning of "alloca-
tion" in ERISA's anti-age-discrimination provision applicable to defined
contribution plans); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2) (A) (2006) ("A defined contri-
bution plan satisfies... [ERISA] if, under the plan, allocations to the employee's
account are not ceased, and the rate at which amounts are allocated to the em-
ployee's account is not reduced, because of age .... "). The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that "there is no statutory difference between the treatment of economically
equivalent defined-benefit [sic] and defined-contribution [sic] plans." Cooper, 457
F.3d at 639. Therefore, ERISA prohibits all employers from engaging in one form
of conduct-discrimination through their allocations to employees' benefits. See
id. (discussing Congress's underlying rationale in enacting ERISA).
20081
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scheme enacted by Congress through ERISA was intended to stop willful
discrimination by employers, which the court did not see as a risk in al-
lowing interest to grow over time. 62 Finally, the court recognized the prac-
tical impact of its decision on both the increasing number of companies
switching to hybrid plans, and the need to apply certain defined contribu-
tion definitions in order for these plans to remain permissible under
law.63
III. ANALYsIS
A. Summary of the Third Circuit's Register Analysis
In Register, the Third Circuit followed the majority of courts that have
ruled on the issue, and found PNC's hybrid pensions permissible under
the anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions of ERISA.
64
Specifically, the Register court considered the permissibility of an em-
ployer's switch from a traditional defined pension plan to a cash balance
plan.65 In making its decision, the court relied heavily on Congress's in-
tent in enacting ERISA and the potential practical impact of the court's
62. See id. at 639, 642 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611
(1993)) (discussing fault in finding time-value of money discriminatory).
63. See id. at 642-43 (discussing practical impact of employer's choice of plan).
The Seventh Circuit appears to have reached its decisions, in part, out of defer-
ence to employers' freedom to choose the best plan to suit their specific individual
situations. See id. at 643 (acknowledging need for flexibility for employers in
choosing models for employee pension plans). The court, therefore, applied ER-
ISA in a way that enforces a baseline of equity-in that employer contributions to
employees' plans are regulated-but also permits the flexibility and freedom re-
quired in pension planning. See id. ("[T]he decision [to use one form of pension
plan] may . . . be made freely, governed by private choice rather than legal
constraint.").
64. See Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)
(finding that cash balance plan was permissible under ERISA's anti-age-discrimina-
tion and anti-backloading provisions).
65. See id. at 60-61 (discussing facts and procedural history of case). PNC
switched its plan in 1999 and began a program typical for a cash balance plan-
employees were assigned hypothetical accounts in which earnings and interest
credits accrued over time. See id. (discussing details of PNC's cash balance plan).
For a discussion of the attributes of a typical cash balance pension plan, see supra
notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
In 2004, former PNC employees, all of whom had been plan participants as
employees, brought a five-part claim against PNC in the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania. See Register, 477 F.3d at 61 (discussing plaintiffs'
claims against PNC); see also Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 36 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1321, 1323 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005) (discussing plaintiffs'
claims). In addition to claiming that PNC's cash balance plan violated the anti-
age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions of ERISA, the plaintiffs also
claimed that the plan violated ERISA-imposed notice and fiduciary duty require-
ments. See Register, 477 F.3d at 61 (discussing plaintiffs' claims against PNC).
These latter claims, like those discussed supra, were dismissed by the district court
on summaryjudgment. See id. at 72-74 (discussing plaintiffs' notice and fiduciary
claims).
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own decision in the case. 66 The Third Circuit also interpreted the history
of pension regulation and relevant Supreme Court precedent to require a
certain degree of flexibility for employers in managing their employees'
pension plans.
6 7
After noting the facts of the case, the Third Circuit began its analysis
by explaining the nature of cash balance plans as a hybrid of the two tradi-
tional forms of pension plans. 68 The court discussed the competing posi-
tions on the issue as argued for in other courts. 69 In considering the
relevant Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit made a point to
evaluate the particular context of that precedent in order to resolve the
tension between cash balance plans and ERISA's "rigid" statutory
scheme.7 0 For the Register court, this context included ERISA provisions
applicable to defined contribution plans, as well as those affecting defined
benefit plans.7 1 Moreover, the court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's
66. See id. at 69-70 (discussing congressional intent and practical impact of
finding that ERISA's anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions do
not prohibit cash balance pension plan).
67. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 886 (discussing differences be-
tween Cooper and Register).
68. See Register, 477 F.3d at 61-63 (explaining nature of cash balance pension
plans as related to two traditional forms of plans). The Third Circuit noted that a
cash balance plan "by law, is a form of defined benefit plan and must comply with
the statutory regulations applicable to defined benefit plans . . . . However, in
actuality, a cash balance plan is a hybrid between a defined contribution plan and
a defined benefit plan as it contains attributes of both." Id. at 62 (citing Esden v.
Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2000)) (noting attributes of cash
balance plan, as compared to two traditional forms of pension plans). The Esden
court, by contrast, noted the hybrid nature of cash balance pension plans, but
more definitively discussed the classification of the plans as defined benefit plans.
See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158 ("[N]otwithstanding that cash balance plans are de-
signed to imitate some features of defined contribution plans, they are nonetheless
defined benefit plans under ERISA.").
69. See Register, 477 F.3d at 66-67 (noting divergent decisions regarding appli-
cability of ERISA to cash balance plans).
70. See id. at 67-68 (discussing anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading
defined benefit plan provisions of ERISA within context of ERISA generally). The
court interpreted its own precedent as requiring it to discern congressional intent
on the issue. See id. at 67 (citing Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d
Cir. 2001)) (concluding that precedent compelled court to look to congressional
intent in order to interpret ERISA); Alaka v. Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 104
(3d Cir. 2006) (same). The Third Circuit's cases required the court to determine
whether an applicable provision of a statute was ambiguous in light of the entire
statutory scheme. See id. (noting Supreme Court precedent on proper methods of
statutory interpretation). Further, the court interpreted Supreme Court case law
to require the reading of a statute "as a whole," and in a manner that avoids pro-
ducing "untenable distinctions and unreasonable results." See id. (quoting King v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)) (discussing proper methods of statu-
tory interpretation); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (same);
see also Esden, 229 F.3d at 159 n.6 (calling ERISA regulations "rigidly binary").
71. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (looking to "parallel" provisions of ERISA for
guidance). First, the court noted that the very nature of cash balance plans as
hybrids suggested a decision similar to that made by the Seventh Circuit in Cooper.
See id. (discussing Cooper and approving of Seventh Circuit's analysis regarding ER-
2008]
15
Cognato: Placing a Round Peg into a Square Hole: The Third Circuit Applies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
conclusion in Cooper that Congress intended the relevant defined benefit
and defined contribution-specific provisions to prevent discriminatory em-
ployer behavior. 72 Therefore, the Third Circuit read the parallel provi-
sions together as a general bar to intentional and dramatic employer
discrimination of employees based on age and terms of service.
73
The court also examined Supreme Court precedent and its own ER-
ISA-related case law and determined that that precedent required the
court to consider a controversy's practical ramifications. 7 4 Here, the Regis-
ter court found that although an argument against cash balance plans had
ISA and cash balance pension plans); see also Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan,
457 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding applicable ERISA provisions regulating
employer inputs). For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Cooper,
see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. Noting the nature of cash balance
plans, the Third Circuit compared the parallel anti-age-discrimination provisions
in ERISA for defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans, and deter-
mined that they were both intended by Congress to prevent the same behavior. See
Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (determining purpose of parallel ERISA anti-age-discrimina-
tion provisions). Quoting the Cooper court, the Third Circuit determined that both
provisions prohibited "'the employer [from ceasing] allocations (or accruals) to
the plan or chang[ing] their rate on account of age."' Id. (quoting Cooper, 457
F.3d at 638) (discussing underlying goals of ERISA still enforced in cash balance
plan); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (H) (i) (2006) (prohibiting age discrimination
by employers that would cause employees' "benefit accrual" to stop or decrease on
account of age); § 1054(b) (2) (A) ("A defined contribution plan satisfies [ERISA]
if, under the plan, allocations to the employee's account are not ceased, and the
rate at which amounts are allocated to the employee's account is not reduced,
because of the attainment of any age."). After reciting the ERISA provision that
applies to defined contribution plans, the Third Circuit held that, "[t] he PNC plan
does not make [a prohibited] reduction." See Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (applying
perceived requirements of ERISA to PNC's cash balance plan); see also § 1054
(b) (2) (A) (describing anti-age-discrimination rule for defined contribution
plans).
72. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68-70 (agreeing with Cooper court's conclusion that
Congress intended ERISA's age discrimination provisions regarding defined bene-
fit plans and defined contribution plans to prevent same behavior by employers);
id. at 71-72 (finding that harm Congress sought to prevent through anti-backload-
ing ERISA provisions was "not implicated by the PNC conversion" to cash balance
plan); see also Cooper, 457 F.3d at 638 (finding that ERISA's anti-age-discrimination
provisions for defined contribution and defined benefit plans "appear to say the
same thing").
73. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68, 70 (discussing Congress's intent that parallel
ERISA provisions prevent intentional employer discrimination on account of em-
ployees' ages).
74. See id. at 67-68 (finding case law to require consideration of possible "'in-
justice or oppression"' through interpretation of statute (quoting Evcco Leasing
Corp. v. Ace Trucking Co., 828 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1987))). The court noted
that Supreme Court precedent required it to read the statute in a manner that
avoided "'unreasonable results"' and tension between provisions of the statutory
scheme. See id. (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982))
(discussing proper methods of statutory interpretation). Further, throughout the
Register decision, the court cited other pension-related Supreme Court decisions
that discussed the impact of their holdings given the realities of the pension indus-
try. See, e.g., id. at 62 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439
(1999)) (discussing details of various pension plans); id. at 66 (citing Hazen Paper
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merit based on the text of ERISA alone, such an argument ignored impor-
tant practical implications. 75 Specifically, the court perceived a strict read-
ing of ERISA to require the end of cash balance pension plans-a
consequence that seemed to the court more restrictive than that which
Congress originally intended.
76
Like the Seventh Circuit, the court in Register found that ERISA ac-
knowledges the importance of flexibility for employers in deciding on an
appropriate pension plan for their employees. 77 Although it does impose
certain important restrictions on employers' decisions, ERISA does not
prohibit adaptation to new market forces.7 8 The court concluded, there-
fore, that the term "benefit accrual" in ERISA applies only to employer
input and not employee receipts.
79
B. Critical Analysis of Register's Framework
In Register, the Third Circuit established a detailed blueprint for
resolving controversies related to cash balance plans and ERISA.8 0 By
carefully explaining the impact of relevant Supreme Court precedent on
the controversy and its own interpretation of the history of the statute, the
court ensured that Registerwill provide a strong foundation for future cases
in the same mold. 8 ' This framework entails considering the broad con-
gressional goals expressed in ERISA, predicting the practical impact of
proposed solutions to controversies before it and preserving a degree of
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)) (determining that reality of money's in-
creasing value over time does not constitute age discrimination).
75. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68-69 (noting that cash balance plans are classified
as defined benefit plans under law, but that ruling in line with classification would
lead to nonsensical ruling).
76. See id. at 64 (agreeing with district court that decision against pension
plan would mean that design of all cash balance plans would violate ERISA); id. at
69 (analogizing effect of pension plan's interest credits to that of money saved in
bank account).
77. See id. at 69 (discussing degree of flexibility ERISA affords employers in
developing pension plans); Cooper, 457 F.3d at 642-43 (finding that in light of stat-
ute, decisions regarding use of interest credits are best "governed by private choice
rather than legal constraint").
78. See Register, 477 F.3d at 69 (finding that employers may use "time value of
money" to entice employees without discriminating against employees on account
of age).
79. See id. at 67-68 (discussing ultimate issue as interpretation of "benefit ac-
crual" and agreeing with Cooper court regarding meaning of term).
80. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 886 (discussing interpretive frame-
work used in Register as appropriate use of congressional intent and existing
precedent).
81. See id. at 886-87 (praising Third Circuit for detailing its reasoning and
providing sound foundation for interpretation); Register, 477 F.3d at 62, 66-68 (dis-
cussing impact of Supreme Court precedent on dispute concerning ERISA and
cash balance pensions).
2008]
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flexibility for employers in determining a suitable pension plan for their
employees.
82
1. Consideration of ERISA 's Broad Goals
In Register, the Third Circuit interpreted ERISA's prohibitions on age
discrimination and backloading in light of the broad congressional goals
expressed in the statute.8 3 To determine Congress's intended meaning of
the term "benefit accrual," the court looked to such factors as the overall
regulatory structure and the reasonableness of results associated with pro-
posed interpretations. 84 An examination of these factors suggested to the
court that Congress intended "benefit accrual" to mean employer input
within the context of a cash balance pension plan.
85
Taking account of the overall statutory context, the court noted the
similarities between ERISA provisions that regulate defined benefit and
defined contribution plans.86 The court believed that these similarities
demonstrated Congress's underlying intention for enacting ERISA: to en-
force fundamental fairness and equity, without overly burdening employ-
82. See Register, 477 F.3d at 67-68 (looking to context of overall statutory
scheme and possible practical impact in interpreting ERISA as applied to cash bal-
ance pension plans); id. at 69 (preserving flexibility for employers in interpreting
ERISA).
83. See id. at 67 (interpreting Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent to
require court to look to congressional intent when interpreting ERISA).
84. See id. (looking to parallel provisions of ERISA tailored towards defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans and finding that both provisions seek
to prohibit same employer behavior).
85. See id. at 67-68 (finding that underlying goals of ERISA did not prevent
PNC from using cash balance pension plan). In reaching this decision, the court
noted the opposite view taken by district courts in the Second Circuit. See id. (dis-
cussing analysis by certain Second Circuit district courts regarding term "benefit
accrual"). The court stated that these district courts "believed that Congress, in
choosing to prohibit discriminatory 'allocat[ions]' in the defined contribution
plan provision but discriminatory 'benefit accrual[s]' in the defined benefit plan
provision, must have intended to prohibit different conduct." Id. (characterizing
reading by district courts of Second Circuit); accord In re Citigroup Pension Plan
ERISA Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d 323, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding term "benefit ac-
crual" in ERISA to refer to employee receipts when applied to cash balance pen-
sion plan); In reJ.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 479, 481
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150,
163 (D. Conn. 2006) (same). For a discussion of the analysis employed by these
and other courts that reached an opposite result to that of the Third Circuit when
construing the same provision of ERISA, see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying
text.
86. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (discussing similarities in parallel ERISA provi-
sions). The court's recognition of this fact coincided with proposed Treasury De-
partment regulations that had been withdrawn during congressional consideration
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006. See STEPHEN J. KRAss, THE 2008 PENSION
ANSWER BOOK 9-33 to 9-34 (2008) (discussing proposed regulations that attempted
to prohibit age discrimination in cash balance pension plans by imposing limits
similar to those affecting both defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans). For a discussion of the rules that Congress ultimately enacted to replace
the proposed regulations, see infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
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ers' flexibility. 87 Specific to age discrimination and backloading, the
Register court viewed this intention as prohibiting only deliberate discrimi-
nation through employer allocations based on age or term of service. 88
The court, pursuant to this interpretation of congressional intent, deter-
mined that "benefit accrual" in the statute refers to employer contribu-
tions to the account balances as defined by the plan.8 9
2. Projecting the Practical Impact of Proposed Solutions
In determining ERISA's meaning, the Third Circuit also attempted to
analyze the practical impact of the solutions proposed by the parties in
Register.90 The court considered the realities of the market as well as the
effect its decision might have in the future.9 1 Like the Seventh Circuit
before it, the court in Register attempted to ensure that, in the current
technical regulatory environment, its interpretation of ERISA did not exist
in a vacuum.9
2
The court believed that it was required by precedent to reach a "rea-
sonable" decision given the reality of the pension marketplace. 9 3 At multi-
87. See KRAss, supra note 86, at 68-69 (citing congressional intent to prevent
unfairness to workers, but not through technical reading of statute); Cooper v.
IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing congres-
sional intent to preserve degree of autonomy for employers despite regulatory
scheme); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006)) (discuss-
ing Congress's purposes in enacting original ERISA legislation).
88. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68, 70-72 (discussing Congress's intentions in ER-
ISA anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading provisions and effect of that in-
tention on cash balance pension plans). The proposed regulations that had been
withdrawn by the time the court decided Register, as well as the Pension Protection
Act of 2006, supported the court's conclusions regarding congressional intent. See
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (revising ERISA's rules regarding age discrimina-
tion to take into account cash balance pension plans); KRAss, supra note 86, at 9-33
to 9-36 (discussing proposed regulations, which prohibited deliberate and dra-
matic discrimination by employers through allocation of contributions and inter-
est credits).
89. See Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (agreeing with Seventh Circuit's Cooper opinion,
which interpreted applicable ERISA provisions regulating employer inputs).
90. See id. at 67-68 (citing Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent that
suggests that courts look to practical impact to interpret ERISA). For a discussion
of the precedent cited by the court and its practical impact as perceived by the
court in the dispute before it, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
91. See Register, 477 F.3d at 64 ("[W]e agree [with the district court] that ap-
pellants' argument, if accepted, would mean 'that all cash balance plans' violate
... ERISA .. " (quoting Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 36 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1321 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005))).
92. See id. at 66-68 (discussing cash balance pension plans, possible purposes
of employers in starting hybrid pension system and relationship between cash bal-
ance plans and two traditional forms of plan).
93. See id. at 67 (finding that interpretation of statute must "'not lead to injus-
tice and oppression,'" nor lead to "'unreasonable results"' (quoting Evcco Leasing
Corp. v. Ace Trucking Co., 828 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1987))); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
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pie points in its decision, the court noted that cash balance plans,
although defined benefit plans under law, are in many ways like defined
contribution plans. 94 The court also noted the prevalence of cash balance
plans and the possibility of rendering all of them illegal.95 Finally, echo-
ing the Seventh Circuit in Cooper, the Register court found that any discrimi-
nation that occurred as a result of cash balance plans was the result of the
time value of money, not employers' deliberate actions.96 Finding such a
practical impact impermissible, the court reasoned, would be
unreasonable.
97
3. Preserving Flexibility for Employers
In Register, the Third Circuit also attempted to reach a decision that
preserved a degree of flexibility for employers to structure employee pen-
sion plans. 98 The court did not hold that employers have complete auton-
omy to organize and maintain their plans.99 In fact, as the court noted,
employers are subject to specific and exacting rules.10 0 Like the Seventh
Circuit, however, the court in Register concluded that although these rules
provide statutory guidance, they cannot frustrate every innovation employ-
ers might conceive of to structure their pension plans.' 0 1
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (requiring that federal courts seek to interpret
statutes reasonably, in light of facts and other sections of statutory scheme).
94. See Register, 477 F.3d at 62-69 (noting hybrid nature of cash balance pen-
sion plans despite their legal classification as defined benefit plans).
95. See id. at 64 n.5 (agreeing with district court that decision against pension
plan would render all cash balance plans illegal under ERISA, and agreeing with
appellees that accordingly, "much is at stake"); see also RIA's COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF
THE PENSION PROTECTION Acr OF 2006 22-23 (2006) (explaining that application of
ERISA provisions in existence before Pension Protection Act of 2006 could render
traditional cash balance pension plans impermissible).
96. See Register, 477 F.3d at 66, 69 ("Treating the time value of money as a
form of discrimination is not sensible." (quoting Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension
Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1143 (2007))).
97. See id. at 67 (determining that Third Circuit and Supreme Court prece-
dent require "reasonable" and just ruling given possible practical impact).
98. See id. at 69 (finding congressional intent to permit employers to provide
young workers with incentive through accrual of interest credits); see also Cooper,
457 F.3d at 642-43 (finding private sphere better regulator of cash balance plans'
interest credits than judiciary).
99. See, e.g., Register, 477 F.3d at 68 (finding all employers prohibited from
making allocations of benefits based on age, regardless of form of pension plan).
100. See id. at 70-71 (interpreting ERISA anti-backloading rules, which pro-
hibit amendments that increase employer inputs by more than 133 1/3% over
previous year); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1)(A) (2006) (prohibiting annual raise
in benefit accrual over certain percentages).
101. See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 642-43 (finding flexibility within private sector nec-
essary in pension planning); Register, 477 F.3d at 68 ("[W]e do not believe that a
cash balance plan's technical classification as a defined benefit plan compels us to
disregard this critical distinction and thereby unreasonably interfere with employ-
ers in the crafting of pension plans.").
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The Register court carefully delineated the ERISA provision that af-
fected the litigation at hand.10 2 The court noted that the statute's anti-age
discrimination rule might have profound consequences.' 0 3 In the eyes of
the court, however, this prohibition did not bar employers from exploring
new alternatives to pension planning. 10 4 Instead, the court considered
employer flexibility to be important in a field that has evolved more
quickly than the applicable regulating statute; accordingly, the court pre-
served a degree of autonomy for private actors. 10 5 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Third Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit's analysis in
Cooper and invoked a clear statement of employer autonomy in the field of
pension planning.
10 6
In conclusion, to resolve disputes between ERISA and cash balance
plans, practitioners before the Third Circuit should employ the Register
court's three-facet analysis as discussed in this section.' 0 7 First, attorneys
will be best able to prevail by showing that one side of a dispute favors the
congressional intent of fairness and flexibility in pension planning.10 8 Ad-
ditionally, this intention should illustrate, within the context of the
broader regulatory scheme, a "reasonable" practical impact on the market
for privately administered pension plans, and should also preserve a de-
gree of flexibility for employers to modify their plans over time.109 Practi-
tioners who are able to integrate their position into this three-facet
framework are likely to be successful when confronted with this type of
conflict before the Third Circuit. 110 As discussed in the forthcoming sec-
102. See Register, 477 F.3d at 63-65 (discussing "competing positions" regard-
ing applicable provisions of ERISA).
103. See id. at 64 & n.5 (noting possibly profound effect of decision against
cash balance pension plan).
104. See id. at 68 (finding flexibility in prohibitions and, ultimately, that ER-
ISA provisions do not apply to interest credits of cash balance pension plans).
105. See id. at 63 (noting that Congress enacted ERISA before development of
cash balance pension plans); see also Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (describing enactment of ERISA and subsequent development of
cash balance pension plans in 1980s); Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 868
(discussing development and growth of cash balance plan in 1980s and 1990s).
106. See, e.g., Register, 477 F.3d at 68, 69 (referencing Seventh Circuit's Cooper
analysis regarding congressional intent, practical impact of issue and need to pre-
serve flexibility for employers); see also Cooper, 457 F.3d at 642 (discussing need to
preserve employers' flexibility in enacting and changing employees' pension
plans).
107. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 886-88 (discussing Register as hav-
ing established framework for addressing applicability of ERISA to cash balance
pension plans). For a discussion of the facets of this analytical framework, see
supra notes 80-106, infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
108. See Register, 477 F.3d at 67 (interpreting Third Circuit and Supreme
Court precedent to require reading of statute that both enforced congressional
intent and preserved 'justice and reasonability).
109. See id. at 67-68 (using three facets to discern just reading of ERISA, in
line with congressional intent, as applied to cash balance pension plans).
110. See id. (ruling in favor of pension plan, as when appellants were able to
frame issue satisfying three facets of Third Circuit's analytical framework).
20081
21
Cognato: Placing a Round Peg into a Square Hole: The Third Circuit Applies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tion, in light of recent congressional action attempting to resolve disputes
between ERISA and cash balance plans, the Register framework is particu-
larly useful when it comes time to address many of the questions left unan-
swered by this new legislation.'II
IV. IMPACT: REGISTER AND THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
With the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress offered
its own remedy to the cash-balance controversy faced by the Third Circuit
in Register. 1 2 When passing legislation to regulate pensions created after
June 2005, Congress adopted an approach similar to that of the Third
Circuit in Register.'1 3 ERISA now permits the creation of cash balance
111. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 891-98 (discussing questions left
unanswered by recent congressional legislation intended to resolve disputed appli-
cation of ERISA to cash balance pension plans). For a discussion of recent con-
gressional action affecting this debate and the implications Register may have on
litigation under this legislation, see infra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
112. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 868, 891-98 (noting enactment of
recent pension legislation and implications for future litigation); see also Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (revising ERISA's rules regarding age discrimination to
take into account cash balance pension plans); RIA's COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE
PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, supra note 95, at 24-25 (explaining Pension
Protection Act innovations affecting cash balance pension plans). The Register
court noted the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and summarized its impact on the
controversy before it:
[The Act] provides that the accrued benefit for the purposes of cash bal-
ance plans may be expressed as the balance of a hypothetical account and
significantly modified the application of the ERISA anti-discrimination
provisions to cash balance plans . . . . However, [the Act] specifically
indicates that nothing in the amendments "shall be construed to create
an inference" with respect to the ERISA's defined benefit plan anti-dis-
crimination provision . . . "as in effect before such amendments."
Register, 477 F.3d at 65 n.8 (quoting Pension Protection Act § 701) (noting lack of
authority to apply recent additions to federal pension law in case before it). The
Pension Protection Act, therefore, affects cash balance plans that have come into
existence after June 29, 2005, and is expressly barred from being used as persua-
sive authority in cases concerning pre-existing cash balance plans. See id. (discuss-
ing provisions of Pension Protection Act that limit its applicability); Kozak &
Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 893 (discussing application of Pension Protection Act
to cash balance plans that came into existence after June 29, 2005).
113. See Pension Protection Act § 701 (providing anti-age-discrimination rules
for employers providing cash balance pension plans for employees). Though the
Act does not answer the Register court's ultimate question regarding the definition
of "benefit accrual," it does provide another means for policing cash balance ac-
counts with goals similar to those of the court in mind. See Register, 477 F.3d at 65
n.8 (noting Act and discussing its impact on controversy before court). Under the
new legislation, the benefits accrued in the hypothetical accounts of similarly situ-
ated employees may not vary based on employees' ages. See Pension Protection Act
§ 701 (providing guidelines regarding age discrimination in cash balance pension
plans); J. COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CON-
SIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, 154-55 (2006), available at http://www.
house.gov/jct/x-38-06.pdf [hereinafter JoIrT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION] (explain-
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plans."14 Additionally, the amended statute allows the benefits of those
enrolled in defined benefit plans to be calculated based on terms of ser-
vice and age. 1 5 Although Congress intended the statute to address the
same controversy at issue in Register, cases involving ERISA's rules will not
cease.1 6 Congress did not prescribe a method for courts to address plans
already in existence, nor did it answer many of the pertinent questions
that arise when applying ERISA to cash balance pensions. 1 7 As such, the
Act sets the stage for the next round of controversies; in such an environ-
ment, an understanding of Register will be crucial. 1 8
In 2006, after cases such as Register had confronted the federal judici-
ary, Congress attempted to solve the problems created by applying ERISA
to cash balance pension plans through the Act. 19 The Act was primarily
aimed at solving other problems faced by employees in the modern pen-
sion environment. Nevertheless, the Act's practical effect is to set new
rules for cash balance pension plans.' 20 In particular, the Act provides
that in cash balance plans, age discrimination under ERISA is determined
by examining employer input and the rates of return on interest credits
relative to market rates and prescribed benchmarks. 12'
ing provisions of Act as applied to cash balance plans). The Act also polices inter-
est credits by relating permissible rates of return to a market rate calculated by the
Secretary of the Treasury. See id. (explaining provisions of Act regarding interest
credits in cash balance pension plan); RIA's COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, supra note 95, at 24-25 (same).
114. See Pension Protection Act § 701 (changing federal law to allow for ac-
crual of interest credits in private pension plan, but limiting degree to which such
credits may disproportionately favor younger workers).
115. SeeJoINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 154-55 (explaining
provisions of Act).
116. See Register, 477 F.3d at 65 n.8 (explaining Act's potential lack of author-
ity in cases involving cash balance pension plans that were in existence before June
29, 2005); Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 893 (discussing authority of Act in
cases concerning pension plans in existence before and afterJune 29, 2005).
117. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 891, 893-98 (discussing Act and
issues that may arise in future pension-related litigation in federal courts).
118. See id. at 893-98 (describing landscape in which future litigation concern-
ing ERISA and cash balance pension plans will be fought).
119. SeeJOiNT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 150-52 (discussing
recent litigation concerning ERISA and cash balance pension plans and address-
ing state of law prior to Pension Protection Act); see also Kozak & Waldbeser, supra
note 6, at 893-98 (discussing various issues settled and left unresolved by Pension
Protection Act).
120. See generally Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 (2006)
(providing, inter alia, for new minimum funding standards for defined benefit
plans and rules for establishment and maintenance of pensions funded by multi-
ple employers); see also Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (prohibiting age discrimina-
tion in hybrid pension plans by requiring equity in benefit accrual and placing
limits on permissible interest rates for interest credits).
121. See Pension Protection Act § 701 (providing new rules to prevent age
discrimination in cash balance pension plans).
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These and other changes to pension law contained within the Act,
however, do not resolve every incongruity between ERISA and cash bal-
ance pensions. 122 The anti-backloading provision of ERISA-which the
Register court attempted to interpret-is not affected by the new legisla-
tion. In addition, commentators point out that other issues not fully ad-
dressed by the Act include "wearaway"-the reduction of funds due to
conversion to a cash balance plan from a traditional form of plan, and
"whipsaw"-a reduction in funds through conversion of an annuity to a
lump sum amount.123 Moreover, a majority of the Act's innovations apply
only prospectively, and function merely as persuasive authority in cases
involving cash balance plans created before June 2005.124
Following the passage of the Act, understanding the Third Circuit's
Register framework is particularly important to practitioners dealing with
ERISA and cash balance pension plans. 125 In Register, the Third Circuit
relied upon the broad goals discernable through ERISA's entire statutory
scheme, the practical impact of proposed solutions and the need for flexi-
122. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 891-98 (discussing issues not re-
solved by Pension Protection Act of 2006).
123. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 411(b) (5) (B) (i), (iii) (2006) (reflecting changes in pen-
sion law made by Pension Protection Act); Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at
894-98 (discussing effect of Act on issues of wearaway and whipsaw). Essentially,
the prospective rules regarding whipsaw and wearaway require employers to pay
employees in such a way that employees do not receive less than the accrued bene-
fit within their hypothetical accounts at the time of their retirement-including
both employer contributions and interest credits, as regulated by Treasury Depart-
ment benchmarks. SeeJOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 156-57
(explaining effect of Act on issues of wearaway and whipsaw).
The Second Circuit confronted the issue of whipsaw in Esden. See Esden v.
Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining that in order to
prevent whipsaw through conversion of plan, ERISA provisions should be read
strictly as applied to cash balance pension plan). See generally Berger v. Xerox
Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003) (addressing whipsaw
issue in manner similar to that of Esden); Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried
Employees Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d 1235 (1lth Cir. 2000) (same), remanded to 196 F.
Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2002). In Esden, the court interpreted the "rigidly binary"
nature of pension regulations as well as relevant agency determinations to require
a strict reading of ERISA defined benefit plan rules. See Esden, 229 F.3d at 158-59
(announcing decision of court concerning whipsaw). For a discussion of Esden
and its impact on courts interpreting the meaning of "benefit accrual" within ER-
ISA's anti-age-discrimination prohibitions, see supra notes 46-54 and accompany-
ing text.
124. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 411(b) (5) (B) (i), (iii) (2006) (providing only for pro-
spective enforcement); Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 895, 897 (discussing
effective dates of innovations to pension law).
125. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 894-98 (discussing impact of Pen-
sion Protection Act of 2006 and explaining context in which future ERISA litiga-
tion may take place).
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bility for employers. 12 6 Given Congress's newest mandates, the nature of
the overall statutory scheme and the pension industry have changed.
1 27
Further, although the Act focuses on employee security, employer
flexibility has been maintained in many instances. 128 Register suggests that
advocates should take note of these developments and use them to craft
arguments to satisfy the Register three-facet analysis.1 29 In future pension
litigation, successful arguments under either the new statutory provisions
of pension law or its unaffected areas will demonstrate that particular posi-
tions satisfy the broader statutory scheme, lead to just and reasonable re-
sults and preserve a necessary degree of flexibility. 130
V. CONCLUSION
In Register, the Third Circuit demonstrated its preferred mode of anal-
ysis in cases concerning ERISA and cash balance pensions. 13 1 Con-
fronting an issue debated throughout the federal judiciary, the court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit and found cash balance plans permissible
despite their hybrid nature.13 2 In doing so, the court chose to interpret
ERISA broadly, by looking to the statutory context of ERISA, the practical
impact of cash balance plans and employer flexibility to finance such
plans.' 3 3 As a result, the court simultaneously permitted cash balance
126. See Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 64-68 (3d Cir.
2007) (employing three-faceted approach for applying ERISA to cash balance pen-
sion plan). For a discussion of these three facets in the court's Register analysis, see
supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
127. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 891-98 (discussing provisions of
Pension Protection Act of 2006 and possible impact on future pension planning
and potential litigation).
128. See generally Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 (2006)
(providing for, inter alia, new minimum funding standards and new standards for
maintenance of cash balance pension plans).
129. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 894-98 (discussing context and
issues for future ERISA cases involving cash balance pension plans).
130. See Register, 477 F.3d at 67-69 (interpreting precedent to require court to
employ analysis appealing to statutory context, practical consequence and em-
ployer flexibility).
131. See id. at 64, 66-69 (discussing factors court considered in finding ERISA
to permit use of cash balance pension plans). For a discussion of the facets of the
Third Circuit's preferred analysis in cases concerning ERISA and cash balance
pension plans, see supra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
132. Compare Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding ERISA rules apply to cash balance plan in same way that they apply to
defined benefit plan), with Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plans, 457 F.3d 637, 642
(7th Cir. 2006) (enforcing court's interpretation of ERISA's goals without restrict-
ing employer's use of cash balance pension plan), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1143
(2007). For a discussion of how the hybrid nature of these plans poses a difficulty
to courts attempting to apply ERISA's anti-age-discrimination and anti-backloading
provisions, as well as solutions offered by various federal courts, see supra notes 2-
63 and accompanying text.
133. See Register, 477 F.3d at 64-69 (finding cash balance plan permissible
under ERISA). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of congressional
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pensions to exist and set the stage for future litigation. 13 4 In the future,
practitioners involved in ERISA-related cash balance plan disputes should
emphasize how their arguments satisfy the three facets set forth by the
Register court.13 5 In the wake of Register, Congress offered its own solutions
to the controversy by passing the Pension Protection Act of 2006.136 This
legislation, however, left several important questions concerning ERISA
and the increasingly popular cash balance pensions unanswered.13 7
When these questions lead to litigation in the Third Circuit, Register will
serve as a useful guide for practitioners as they address the next phase of
ERISA-related controversies. 13 8
Christopher Cognato
intent, practical impact and maintenance of employer flexibility in Register, see
supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
134. See Kozak & Waldbeser, supra note 6, at 886-88 (discussing Register and
potential for case to serve as framework for future decisions). For a discussion of
Register's impact on future cash balance litigation, see supra notes 80-112 and ac-
companying text.
135. See Register, 477 F.3d at 64-69 (employing three-faceted method of analy-
sis to interpret ERISA as applied to cash balance pension plan). For suggestions to
practitioners, derived from the Third Circuit's Register analysis, see supra notes 108-
12 and accompanying text.
136. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (providing new rules that bar age dis-
crimination in cash balance pension plans). For a discussion of the relevant provi-
sions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, see supra notes 113-22 and
accompanying text.
137. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2006)) (applying rules only to pension cre-
ated after June 2005). For a discussion of the questions left unanswered by Con-
gress in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, see supra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text.
138. See Register, 477 F.3d at 64-69 (providing template for analysis of future
cases concerning ERISA). For a discussion of how practitioners may best employ
the court's Register analysis to succeed in cases subsequent to the Pension Protec-
tion Act of 2006, see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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